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HUMAN ERROR AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY IN
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS1
Jens Rasmussen
Risø National Laboratory,
DK 40000, Roskilde, Denmark
Abstract: Present technology is characterised by complexity, rapid change, and
growing size of technical systems. This has caused a rapidly increasing concern
with the human involvement in system safety. Analyses of the major accidents
during recent decades have typically concluded that human errors on part of
operators, designers or managers have played a major role. There are, however,
several basic problems in analysis of accidents and identification of human
error. The paper addresses the nature of causal explanations and the ambiguity
of the rules applied for identification of the events to include in analysis and for
termination of the search for 'causes.' In addition, the concept of human error is
analysed and its intimate relation with human adaptation and learning is dis-
cussed. It is concluded that identification of errors as a separate class of be-
haviour is becoming increasingly difficult in modern work environments. The in-
fluence of this change on the control of safety of large scale industrial systems is
discussed.
INTRODUCTION
During recent decades the technological evolution has drastically changed
the nature of the human factors problems one is faced with in industrial
safety. In previous periods, the analysis of industrial systems could be rea-
sonably well decomposed into problems which could be treated separately by
different professions, and human factors specialists were primarily involved
in attempts match the interface between people and equipment to human
characteristics.
Complexity, rapid change, and growing size of technical systems have
drastically changed this state of affairs. The hazards involved in operation of
large-scale systems lead to reliability and safety requirements which cannot
be proven empirically and, consequently, design must be based on models
that can be used to predict the effects of technical faults and human errors
during operation and to evaluate the ability of the operating organisation to
cope with such disturbances. The human factors problems of industrial
safety in this situation not only include the classical interface problems, but
also problems such as the ability of the designers to predict and supply the
means to control the relevant disturbances to an acceptable degree of com-
pleteness, the ability of the operating staff to cope with unforeseen and rare
disturbances, and the ability of the organisation in charge of operation to
maintain an acceptable quality of risk management. The human factors
problems of industrial safety have become a true cross-disciplinary issue.
                                      
1Invited presentation at Royal Society meeting on Human Factors in High Risk
Situations, London, 28-29 June, 1989. In: Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 327, 449-462.
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Analyses of the major accidents during recent decades have typically con-
cluded that human errors on part of operators, designers or managers have
played a major role. However, to come from this conclusion to suggestion of
improvement is no easy matter and this problem appears to raise a couple of
very basic issues related to the nature of causal explanations and the con-
cept of human error.
One basic issue to consider is the changing nature of engineering analysis
which in the past was a fairly well structured and bounded science.
Technical designs could be verified and tested by quantitative models and
controlled laboratory experiments. Descriptions in terms of mathematical
relations among quantitative measurable variables were very effective for
verification of design consistency and for optimisation of the internal func-
tion, as for instance of the thermodynamic process of a steam locomotive.
Description of the less well formed relational structure of an accident such
as a train crash was the business of another profession and the complexity
of the situation required the use of  less stringent causal analyses in terms
of chains of events in which the internal functioning of the artefact is of
minor importance; a locomotive in an accident is mainly a heavy object, not
a thermo-dynamic machine. This separation of the two domains of analysis
is no longer acceptable for systems such as chemical plants for which the
internal functioning during accidents is determining the external damage.
The interaction of relational and causal analysis therefore must be better
understood and the integration of the two methods of analysis must be im-
proved.
Another issue is  the notion of human error. The concept of error is chal-
lenged by the rapid technological evolution and the transfer of people from
manual manufacturing tasks to supervision and intervention during distur-
bances in automated systems. In a traditional work setting, the slow pace of
change led to the evolution of fairly stable work procedures and it was  easy
to define human error with reference to normal practice. Consequently, in
the traditional technology with slowly changing systems, causes of accidents
were rather easy to determine and to attribute to technical faults or human
error. Recently, however, some large scale accidents point to the need to ex-
plain accidents in terms of structural properties of integrated, large scale
systems rather than to isolated links or conditions in a linear causal chain
of events.
CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS
When analysing accidents after the fact, we are following a chain of events
up-stream  in order to understand,  why  it happened; to find somebody to
blame, who done it; or find out how to improve the system. We are trying to
describe a particular course of events and to identify the causes of the par-
ticular accident. It is, however, important to consider the implicit frame of
reference of a causal analysis  (Rasmussen, 1988a).
Causal Explanation.
A classical engineering analysis is based on mathematical equations relating
physical, measurable variables. The  generalisation depends on a selection of
relationships which are 'practically isolated' (Russell, 1912). This is possible
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when they are isolated by nature (e.g., being  found in the planetary system)
or because a system is designed so as to isolate the relationship of interest
(e.g., in scientific experiment or a machine supporting a physical process in
a controlled way). In this representation, material objects are only implicitly
present in the parameter sets of the mathematical equations. The represen-
tation is particularly well suited  for analysis of the optimal conditions and
theoretical limits of physical processes in a technical system which, by its
very design, carefully separates physical processes from the complexity of
the outside world.
A causal representation is expressed in terms of regular causal connec-
tions of events. Russell (1912) discusses the ambiguity of the terms used to
define causality: the necessary connection of events in time sequences. The
concept of an 'event,' for instance,  is elusive: the more accurate the defini-
tion of an event, the less is the probability that it is ever repeated.
Completeness removes regularity. The solution is, however, not to give up
causal explanations.  Representation of the behaviour of the physical world
in causal terms is very effective for describing accidents because the objects
of the real world are explicit in the model and changes such as technical
faults are easily modelled. This is not the case in a model based on relations
among quantitative variables in which properties of an object are embedded
in several parameters and equations. On the other hand, rather than to seek
objective definitions it must be realised that regularity in terms of causal
relations is found between kinds of events, types, not between particular,
individually defined events, tokens.
The behaviour of the complex, real world is a continuous, dynamic flow
which can only be explained in causal terms after decomposition into dis-
crete events. The concept of a causal interaction of events and objects de-
pends on a categorisation of human observations and experiences.
Perception of occurrences as events in causal connection does not depend
on categories which are defined by lists of objective attributes but on
categories which are identified by typical examples, prototypes (as defined by
Rosch, 1975). This is the case for objects as well as for events. Everybody
knows perfectly well what 'a cup' is. To define it objectively by a list of
attributes that separates cups from jars, vases and bowls is no trivial
problem and it has been met in many attempts to design computer
programs for picture analysis.   The problem is, that the property to be 'a
cup' is not a feature of an isolated object but depends on the context of
human needs and experience. The identification of events in the same way
depends on the relationship in which they appear in a causal statement. An
objective definition, therefore, will be circular.
A classical example is "the short-circuit caused the fire in the house"
(Mackie, 1965). This statement in fact only interrelates the two prototypes:
the kind of short-circuit that can cause a fire in that kind of house. The
explanation that the short-circuit caused a fire may be immediately accepted
by an audience from a region where open wiring and wooden houses are
commonplace, but not in a region where brick houses are the more usual
kind. If not accepted, a search for more information is necessary. Short-cir-
cuits normally blow fuses, therefore further analysis of the conditions pre-
sent in the electric circuit is necessary, together with more information on
the path of the fire from the wiring to the house. A path of unusually in-
J. RASMUSSEN 4
flammable material was probably present. In addition, an explanation of the
short-circuit - its cause - may be needed. The explanation depends on a de-
composition and search for unusual conditions and events. The normal and
usual conditions will betaken for granted, i.e., implicit in the intuitive frame
of reference. Therefore, in causal explanations, the level of decomposition
needed to make it understood and accepted depends entirely on the intuitive
background of the intended audience. If a causal statement is not accepted,
formal logical analysis and deduction will not help, it will be easy to give
counter-examples which can not easily be falsified. Instead, further search
and decomposition are necessary until a level is found where the prototypes
and relations match intuition. (The reason that nuclear power opponents do
not accept risk analysis may be that they have an intuition very different
from the risk analyst's intuition,  rather than a lack of understanding of risk
and probability).
Accident Analysis.
The very nature of causal explanations shapes the analysis of accidents.
Decomposition of the dynamic flow of changes will normally terminate when
a sequence is found including events which match the prototypes familiar to
the analyst.  The resulting explanation will take for granted his frame of ref-
erence and in general, only what he finds to be unusual will be included: the
less familiar the context, the more detailed the decomposition. By means of
the analysis, a causal path is found up-stream from the accidental effect.
This path will be prepared by resident conditions which are latent effects of
earlier events or acts. Also these resident pathogens (Reason, 1989) can be
explained by causal back-tracking and in this case branches in the path are
found. To explain the accident, these branches are also traced backward
until all conditions are explained by abnormal, but familiar events or acts.
The point is: how do the degree of decomposition of the causal explanation
and selection of the side-branches depend on the circumstances of the anal-
ysis? Another question is: What is the stop-rule applied for termination of
the search for causes? Ambiguous and implicit stop rules will make the re-
sults of analyses very sensitive to the topics discussed in the professional
community at any given time. There is a tendency to see what you expect to
find; during one period, technical faults were in focus as causes of acci-
dents, then human errors predominated while in the future focus will prob-
ably move up-stream to designers and managers. This points to the question
whether system break-down is related to higher level functional structures
and feedback mechanisms rather than to the local conditions of events. In
that case, traditional causal attributions turn out to be fighting symptoms
rather than the structural origin of break-down.
The adoption of stop-rules is very important in the control of causal ex-
planations. Every college student knows the relief felt when finding a list of
solutions to math problems. Not that it gave the path to solution to any
great extent, but it gave a clear stop-rule for the search for possible mis-
takes, overseen preconditions, and calculation errors. The result: hours
saved and peace of mind. A more professional example to the same point is
given by Kuhn (1976). He mentions the fact that chemical research was only
able to come up with whole-number relations between elements of chemical
substances after the acceptance of John Dalton's chemical atom theory.
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There had been no stop rule for the efforts in refinement of the experimental
technique until the acceptance of this theory.
Stop-rules are not usually formulated explicitly. The search will typically
be terminated pragmatically in one of the following ways: (a) An event will be
accepted as a cause and the search terminated if the causal path can no
longer be followed because information is missing; (b) A familiar, abnormal
event is found to be a reasonable explanation; or (c) A cure is available. The
dependence of the stop rule upon familiarity and the availability of a cure
makes the judgement very dependent upon the role in which a judge finds
himself. An operator, a supervisor, a designer, and a legal judge will reach
different conclusions.
To summarise: identification of accident causes is controlled by prag-
matic, subjective stop-rules. These rules depend on the aim of the analysis,
i.e., whether the aim is to explain the course of events, to allocate respon-
sibility and blame, or to identify possible system improvements in order to
avoid future accidents.
Analysis for Explanation.
In an analysis to explain an accident, the backtracking will be continued
until a cause is found which is familiar to the analysts. If a technical com-
ponent fails, a component fault will only be accepted as the prime cause if
the failure of the particular type of component appears to be 'as usual.'
Further search will probably be made, if the consequences of the fault make
the designer's choice of component quality unreasonable, or if a reasonable
operator could have terminated the effect, had he been more alert or been
better trained. In such a case, a design or manufacturing error, respectively
an operator error will be accepted for explanation.
In most recent reviews of larger industrial accidents, it has been found
that human errors are playing an important role in the course of events.
Very frequently, errors are attributed to operators involved in the dynamic flow
of events. This can be an effect of the very nature of the causal explanation.
Human error is, particularly at present, familiar to an analyst: to err is hu-
man, and the high skill of professional people normally depend on departure
from normative procedures as we will see in a subsequent section. To work
according to rules has been an effective replacement for formal strikes
among civil servants.
Analysis for Allocation of Responsibility.
In order to allocate responsibility, the stop-rule of the backward tracing of
events will be  to identify a person who made an error and at the same time,
'was in power of control' of his acts. The very nature of the causal explana-
tion will focus attention on people directly and dynamically involved in the
flow of abnormal events.  This is unfortunate because they can very well be
in a situation where they do not have the 'power of control.' Traditionally, a
person is not considered in power of control when physically forced by an-
other person or when subject to disorders such as e.g., epileptic attacks. In
such cases, acts are involuntary (Fitzgerald, 1961; Feinberg, 1965), from a
judgement based on physical or physiological factors. It is, however, a ques-
tion as to whether cognitive, psychological factors should be taken more into
account when judging 'power of control.' Inadequate response of operators to
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unfamiliar events depends very much on the conditioning taking place
during normal work. This problem also raises the question of the nature of
human error. The behaviour of operators is conditioned by the conscious
decisions made by work planners or managers. They will very likely be more
'in power of control' than an operator in the dynamic flow of events.
However, their  decisions may not be considered during a causal analysis af-
ter an accident because they are 'normal events' which are not usually rep-
resented in an accident analysis. Furthermore, they can be missed in analy-
sis because they are to be found in a conditioning side branch of the causal
tree, not in the path involved in the dynamic flow.
Present technological development toward high hazard systems requires a
very careful consideration by designers of the effects of 'human errors' which
are commonplace in normal, daily activities, but unacceptable in large-scale
systems. There is considerable danger that systematic traps can be arranged
for people in the dynamic course of events. The present concept of 'power of
control' should be reconsidered from a cognitive point of view, as should the
ambiguity of stop-rules in causal analysis to avoid unfair causal attribution
to the people involved in the dynamic chain of events.
Analysis for System Improvements.
Analysis for therapeutic purpose, i.e., for system improvement, will require a
different focus with respect to selection of the causal network and of the
stop-rule. The stop-rule will now be related to the question of whether an
effective cure is known. Frequently, cure will be associated with events per-
ceived to be 'root causes'. In general, however, the effects of accidental
courses of events can be avoided by breaking or blocking any link in the
causal tree or its conditioning side branches. Explanatory descriptions of
accidents are, as mentioned,  focused on the unusual events. However, the
path can also be broken by changing normal events and functions involved.
The decomposition of the flow of events, therefore, should not focus on un-
usual events, but also include normal activities.
The aim is to find conditions sensitive to improvements. Improvements
imply that some person in the system makes decisions differently in the fu-
ture. How do we systematically identify persons and decisions in a (normal)
situation when it would be psychologically feasible to ask for a change in
behaviour as long as reports from accidents focus only on the flow of un-
usual events? An approach to such an analysis for improving work safety
has been discussed elsewhere (Leplat and Rasmussen, 1984).
Another basic difficulty is that this kind of analysis for improvement pre-
supposes a stable causal structure of the system, it does not take into ac-
count closed loops of interaction among events and conditions at a higher
level of individual and organisational adaptation. A new approach to gen-
eralisation from analysis of the particular tokens of causal connections
found in accident reports is necessary. The causal tree found by an accident
analysis is only a record of one past case, not a model of the involved rela-
tional structure.
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HUMAN ERROR, A STABLE CATEGORY?
A number of problems are met when attempts are made to improve safety of
socio-technical systems from analyses tied to particular  paths of accidental
events. This is due to the fact that each path is a particular token shaped by
higher order relational structures. If changes are introduced to remove the
conditions of a particular link in the chain, odds are that this particular
situation will never occur again. We should be fighting types, not individual
tokens (Reason & Wagenaar, 1989). Human behaviour is constrained in a
way that makes the chain of events reasonably predictable only in the im-
mediate interface to the technical systems. The longer away from the techni-
cal core we are, the more degrees of freedom agents have in their mode of
behaviour. Consequently, the less certain is also the reference in terms of
normal or proper behaviour for judging 'errors'. In this situation, improve-
ments of safety features of a socio-technical system depend on a global,
structural analysis: No longer can we assume the particular traces of human
behaviour to be predictable. Tasks will be formed for the occasion, and de-
sign for improvements must be based on attempts to find means of control
at higher levels than the level of particular task procedures. If, for instance,
socio-technical systems have features of adaptation and self-organisation,
changes to improve safety at the individual task level can very well be com-
pared to attempts to control the temperature in a room with a thermostat-
controlled heater by opening the window. In other words, it is not sensible to
try to change performance of a feedback system by changes inside the loop,
you have to identify mechanisms that are sensitive, i.e., related to the
control reference itself.
In traditional, stable systems human errors are related to features such as
1. conflicts among cognitive control structures and  2. stochastic variability,
both of which can be studied separately under laboratory conditions. In
modern, flexible and rapidly changing work conditions and socio-technical
systems other features are equally important, such as 3. resource limita-
tions which turn up in unpredicted situations and finally, 4. the influence of
human learning and adaptation. In the present context, the relationship
between learning and adaptation and the concept of error appears to be im-
portant.
Human Adaptation.
In all work situations constraints are found which must be respected to ob-
tain satisfactory performance. There are, however, also many degrees of free-
dom which have to be resolved at the worker's discretion. In stable work
conditions, know-how will develop which represents prior decisions and
choice, and the perceived degrees of freedom will ultimately be very limited,
i.e., 'normal ways' of doing things will emerge, and the process of exploration
necessary for adaptation will no longer be messing-up the concept of error.
In contrast, in modern,  flexible and dynamic work conditions, the
immediate degrees of freedom will have to be continuously resolved. This
implies that effective work performance includes continuous exploration of
the available degrees of freedom together with effective strategies for making
choice, in addition to the task of controlling the chosen path to a goal.
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Therefore,  the basis of concept of error is changed in a very fundamental
way.
The behaviour in work of individuals (and, consequently, also of) is, by
definition, oriented towards the requirements of the work environment as
perceived by the individual. Work requirements, what should be done, will
normally be perceived in terms of control of the state of affairs in the work
environment according to a goal, i.e., why it should be done. How these
changes are made to a certain degree is a matter of discretion on part of the
agent and cannot be predicted for a flexible environment.
The alternative, acceptable work activities,  how to work, will be shaped by
the work environment which defines the boundaries of the space of possibili-
ties, i.e., acceptable  work strategies. This space of possibilities will be fur-
ther bounded by the resource profile of the particular agent in terms of tools
available, knowledge (competence), information about state of affairs, and
processing capacity. The presence of alternatives for action depends on a
many-to-many mapping between means and ends present in the work situa-
tion as perceived by the individual; in general, several functions can serve
the individual goals and each of the functions can be implemented by differ-
ent tools and physical processes. If this was not the case, the work environ-
ment would be totally predetermined and there would be no need for human
choice or decision.
Within the space of acceptable work performance found between the
boundaries defined by the work requirements on one side and the individual
resource profile on the other side, considerable degrees of freedom are still
left for the individual to choose among strategies and to implement them in
particular sequences of behaviour. These degrees of freedom must be elimi-
nated by a choice made by an agent to finally enter a particular course of
action. The different ways to accomplish work can be categorised in terms of
strategies, defined as types of behavioural sequences which are similar in
some well defined aspects, such as the physical process applied in work and
the related tools or, for mental strategies, the underlying kind of mental rep-
resentation and the level of interpretation of perceived information. In actual
performance, a particular situation-dependent exemplar of performance, a
token, will emerge which is an implementation of the chosen strategy under
the influence of the complexity of detail in the environment. The particular
token of performance will be unique, impossible to predict, whereas the
strategy chosen  will, in principle, be predictable. This choice made by the
individual agents depends on subjective performance criteria related to the
process of work such as time spent, cognitive strain, joy, cost of failure, etc.
Normally, dynamic shifting among alternative strategies is very important for
skilled people as a means to resolve resource-demand conflicts met during
performance.
ADAPTATION, SELF-ORGANISATION AND  ERROR.
It follows directly from this discussion that structuring the work processes
by an individual in a flexible environment will be a self-organising, evolu-
tionary process, simply because an optimising  search is the only way in
which the large number of degrees of freedom in a complex situation can be
resolved. The basic synchronisation to the work requirements can be based
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on procedures learned from an instructor or a more experienced colleague or
it can be planned by the individual on occasion in a knowledge-based mode
of reasoning by means of mental experiments. From here, the smoothness
and speed characterising high professional skill  together with a large reper-
toire of heuristic know-how rules will evolve through an adaptation process
in which 'errors' are unavoidable side effects of the exploration of the
boundaries of the envelope of acceptable performance. During this adapta-
tion, performance will be optimised according to the individual's subjective
process criteria within the boundary of his individual resources. This com-
plex adaptation of performance to work requirements, eliminating the ne-
cessity of continuous choice will result in stereotype practices depending on
the individual performance criteria of the agents. These criteria will be sig-
nificantly influenced by the social norms and culture of the group and or-
ganisation. Very likely, conflict will be found between global work goals and
the effect of local adaptation according to subjective process criteria.
Unfortunately, the perception of process quality can be immediate and un-
conditional while the effect on product quality of the choice of an actor can be
considerably delayed, obscure and frequently conditional with respect to
multiple other factors.
In a first encounter, if representation of work constraints is not present in
the form of instructions from an experienced colleague or a teacher, and
know-how from previous experiences is not ready, the constraints of the
work have to be explored in a knowledge-based mode from explicit consider-
ation of the actual goal and a functional understanding of the relational
structure of the work content. For such initial exploration as well as for
problem solving during unusual task conditions, opportunity for test of hy-
potheses and trial-and-error learning is important. It is typically expected
that qualified personnel such as process operators will and can test their di-
agnostic hypotheses conceptually - by thought experiments - before actual
operations if acts are likely to be irreversible and risky.  This appears, how-
ever, to be an unrealistic assumption, since it may be tempting to test a hy-
pothesis on the physical work environment itself in order to avoid the strain
and unreliability related to unsupported reasoning in a complex causal net.
For such a task, a designer is supplied with effective tools such as experi-
mental set-ups, simulation programs and computational aids, whereas the
operator has only his head and the plant itself. In the actual situation, no
explicit stop rule exists to guide the termination of conceptual analysis and
the start of action. This means that the definition of error, as seen from the
situation of a decision maker, is very arbitrary. Acts which are quite rational
and important during the search for information and test of hypothesis may
appear to be unacceptable mistakes in hindsight, without access to the de-
tails of the situation.
Even if a human actor is 'synchronised' to the basic requirements of work
by effective  procedures, there will be ample opportunities for refinement of
such procedures. Development of expert know-how and rules-of-thumb de-
pends on adaptation governed by subjective process criteria. Opportunities
for experiments are necessary to find shortcuts and to identify convenient
and reliable cues for action without analytical diagnosis. In other words, ef-
fective, professional performance depends on empirical correlation of cues to
successful acts. Humans typically seek the way of least effort. Therefore, ex-
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perts will not consult the complete set of defining attributes in a familiar
situation. Instead it can be expected that no more information will be used
than is necessary for discrimination among the perceived alternatives for
action in the particular situation. This implies that the choice is 'under-
specified' (Reason, 1986) outside this situation. When situations change,
e.g., due to disturbances or faults in the system to be controlled, reliance on
the usual cues which are no longer valid, will cause an error due to
inappropriate "expectations." In this way, traps causing systematic mistakes
can be designed into the system. Two types of errors are related to this kind
of adaptation: The effect of the test of a hypothesis of a cue-action set which
turn out negative, and the effects of acts chosen from familiar and tested
cues when a change in system conditions make the cue unreliable.
Work according to instructions which take into consideration the possible
presence of abnormal conditions that will make certain orders of actions
unacceptable, presents an example in which local adaptation very likely will
be in conflict with delayed and conditional effect on the outcome. The be
safe, the instruction may require a certain sequence of the necessary acts. If
this prescribed order is in conflict with the actor's immediate process crite-
ria, modification of the prescribed procedure is very likely and will have no
adverse effect in the daily routine. (If, for instance, an actor has to move
back and forth between several, distant locations because only that se-
quence is safe under certain infrequent, hazardous  conditions, his process
criterion may rapidly teach him to group actions at the same location to-
gether because this change in the procedure will not have any visible effect
under normal circumstances).
Even within an established, effective sequence of actions, evolution of pat-
terns of movements will take place according to subconscious perception of
certain process qualities. In a manual skill, fine-tuning depends upon a
continuous updating of automated patterns of movement to the temporal
and spatial features of the task environment. If the optimisation criteria are
speed and smoothness, adaptation can only be constrained by the once-in-
a-while experience gained when crossing the tolerance limits, i.e. by the ex-
perience of errors or near-errors (speed-accuracy trade-off). Some errors,
therefore, have a function in maintaining a skill at its proper level, and they
cannot be considered a separate category of events in a causal chain
because they are integral parts of a feed-back loop. Another effect of
increasing skill is the evolution  of increasingly long and complex  patterns
of movements which can run off without conscious control. During such
lengthy automated patterns attention may be directed towards review of past
experience or planning of future needs and performance becomes sensitive
to interference, i.e., capture from very familiar cues.
The basic issue is that human errors cannot be removed in flexible or
changing work environments by improved system design or better instruc-
tion, nor should they be. Instead, the ability to explore degrees of freedom
should be supported and means for recovery from the effects of errors
should be found.
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SYSTEM SAFETY, ADAPTATION, AND ERROR RECOVERY
The dynamic adaptation to the immediate work requirements both of the
individual performance and of the allocation between individuals probably
can be combined with a very high degree of reliability but only if errors are
observable and reversible (i.e.; critical aspects are visible without excessive
delay), and individual process criteria are not overriding critical product cri-
teria.
System break-down and accidents are the reflections of loss of control of
the work environment in some way or another. If the hypothesis is accepted
that humans tend to close their degrees of freedom to get rid of choice and
decision during normal work and that errors are a necessary part of this
adaptation, the trick in design of reliable systems is to make sure that hu-
man actors  maintain sufficient flexibility to cope with system aberrations,
i.e., not to constrain them by an inadequate rule system. In addition, it ap-
pears to be essential that actors maintain 'contact' with hazards in a way
that they will be familiar with the boundary to loss of control and will learn
to recover (see the study of high reliable organisations described by Rochlin
et al., 1989). In 'safe' system in which the margins between normal operation
and loss of control  are made as wide as possible the odds are that the
actors will not be able to sense the boundaries and, frequently, the bound-
aries will then be more abrupt and irreversible. When radar was introduced
to increase safety at sea, the result was not increased safety but more effi-
cient transportation under bad weather conditions. Will anti-blocking car
brakes increase safety or give more efficient transport together with more
abrupt and irreversible boundaries to loss of control? A basic design ques-
tion is: How can boundaries of acceptable performance be established that
will give feedback to a learning mode in a reversible way, i.e., absorb viola-
tions in a mode of graceful degradation of the opportunity for recovery?
Under certain conditions self-organising and adaptive features will neces-
sarily lead to 'catastrophic' system behaviour unless certain organisational
criteria are met. Adaptation will normally be governed by local criteria, re-
lated to an individual's perception of process qualities in order to resolve the
perceived degrees of freedom in the immediate situation. Some critical prod-
uct criteria (e.g., safety) are conditionally related to higher level combination
or coincidence of effects of several activities, allocated different agents and
probably, in different time slots. The violation of such high level, conditional
criteria cannot be monitored and detected at the local criterion level, and
monitoring by their ultimate criterion effect will be too late and
unacceptable. Catastrophic effects of adaptation can only be avoided if local
activities are tightly monitored with reference to a prediction of their role in
the ultimate, conditional effect, i.e., the boundaries at the local activities are
necessarily defined by formal prescriptions, not active, functional conditions.
(As argued below, the only possible source of this formal prescription is a
quantitative risk analysis which, consequently, should be used as a risk
management tool, not only as the basis for system acceptance.
 This feature of adaptation to local work requirements probably consti-
tutes the fallacy of the defence-in-depth design principle normally applied in
high risk industries (Rasmussen, 1988b). In systems designed according to
this principle, an accident is dependent on simultaneous violation of several
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lines of defence: an operational disturbance (technical fault or operator er-
ror) must coincide with a latent faulty maintenance condition in protective
systems, with inadequacies in protective barriers, with inadequate control of
the location of people close to the installation etc. The activities threatening
the various conditions normally belong to different branches of the organi-
sation. The presence of potential of a catastrophic combination of effects of lo-
cal adaptation to performance criteria can only be detected at a level in the
organisation with the proper overview. However, at this level of the control
hierarchy (organisation), the required understanding of conditionally dan-
gerous relations cannot be maintained through longer periods because the
required functional and technical knowledge is foreign to the normal man-
agement tasks at this level.
The conclusion of this discussion is that catastrophic system breakdown
is a normal feature of systems which have self-organising features and at the
same time, depend on protection against rare combination of conditions
which are individually affected by adaptation. Safety of such systems de-
pends on the introduction of locally visible boundaries of acceptable adap-
tation and introduction of related control mechanisms. What does this mean
in terms of organisational structures? What kind of top-down influence from
'management culture' and bottom-up technological constraints can be used
to guide and limit adaptation? How can we model and predict evolution of
organisational structure and the influence on system safety?
CONTROL OF SAFETY IN HIGH HAZARD SYSTEMS
The trend towards large-scale industrial process plants and the related de-
fence-in-depth design practice point attention to the need for a better inte-
gration of the organisation of plant design and of its operation. For large-
scale, hazardous systems, the actual level of safety cannot be directly con-
trolled from empirical evidence. For such installations, design cannot be
based on experience gained from accidents, as it has been the case for acci-
dents in minor separate systems when, for instance, considering work and
traffic safety. Consequently, the days of extensive pilot plant tests for
demonstration of the feasibility of a design are also gone and safety targets
have to be assessed by analytical means based on empirical data from inci-
dents and near misses, i.e., data on individual, simple  faults and errors. For
this purpose, large efforts have been spent on developing methods for
probabilistic risk analysis for industrial process plants.
Typically, however, such risk analysis is considered only for the initial ac-
ceptance of a particular plant design. It is generally not fully realised that a
risk analysis is only a theoretical construct relating a plant model and a
number of assumptions concerning its operation and maintenance to a risk
figure. This fact implies that following the acceptance of a plant on the basis
of the calculated risk, the model and assumptions underlying the risk anal-
ysis should be considered to be specifications of the preconditions for safe
operation which, in turn,  should be carefully monitored by the operating
organisation through the entire plant life (Rasmussen and Pedersen, 1984).
This use of a risk analysis raises some important problems. Risk analysis
and, in particular, the underlying hazard identification are at present an art
rather than a systematic science. We have systematic methods for analysing
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specific accidental courses of events, the tokens. However, identification and
characterisation of the types of hazards to analyse, in particular related to
the influence of human activities during operation, maintenance and plants
management, to a large extent depend upon the creativity and intuition of
the analyst as it will be the case in any causal analysis. It is, therefore, dif-
ficult to make explicit the strategy used for hazard identification, the model
of the system  and its operating staff used for analysis, and the assumptions
made regarding its operating conditions. Even if communication of causal
arguments is unreliable between groups having different intuition such as
designers and operations management, progress can be made, considering
that the documentation of a risk analysis today is not designed for use
during operations and maintenance planning and therefore is less accessible
for practical operations management (Rasmussen, 1988b).
Another problem is the changing requirements to system management.
Present organisation structures and management strategies in industry still
reflect a tradition which has evolved through a period when safety could be
controlled directly and empirically. The new requirements for safety control
based on risk analyses have not yet had the necessary influence on the pre-
dominant organisational philosophy. The basic problem is that empirical
evidence from improved functionality and efficiency is likely to be direct and
unconditional, when changes are made to meet economic pressure in a com-
petitive environment. In contrast, decrease of safety margin in a 'safe' system
caused by local sub-optimisation, tends to be delayed and conditional and to
require careful monitoring at higher management levels. Risk management
requires a supplement of the traditional empirical management strategies by
analytical strategies based on technical understanding and formal analysis.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of the arguments presented are that the present rapid trend
towards very large and complex systems, process plants as well as systems
for financial operations and for information storage and communication,
calls for a reconsideration of some of the basic approaches to system design
and operation and to the role of human error in system safety. Some of the
deficiencies presently attributed to operator or management deficiencies may
very well be structural problems which have to be considered at a much
more fundamental level than efforts to improve human reliability.
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